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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Talon Scott Ross appeals from the

sentence, arguing that the district court erred

by committing

Statement

order revoking probation and imposing

district court’s

When

it

found he violated the terms 0f his probation

the crimes of petit theft and injury to child.

Of The

In 2011,

Facts

And Course Of The

Ross pled guilty

t0

Proceedings

one count of robbery.

(ﬂ R.,

The

p.79.)

sentenced Ross to ten years, With three years ﬁxed, and retained jurisdiction.

district court

(R., pp.95-96.)

After he completed his rider, the district court suspended Ross’s sentence and placed

supervised probation for three years.

him on

Included in the terms of probation, t0

(R., pp.105-06.)

Which Ross agreed, was the following provision: “[Y]ou

shall

commit no

Violations of any law

0f the United States of America, or any law 0f any other country, or 0f any law of any
county,

0r other political subdivision.” (R., p. 107.)

city,

The

state,

state

ﬁled four separate reports of probation Violations in the following years.

pp.121-24, 159-61, 229-30, 262-63.)

Each time, Ross admitted Violating

time, the district court revoked his probation,

jurisdiction.

(R.,

(R.,

his probation; each

imposed the underlying sentence, and retained

pp.140-44, 202-03, 206, 213-14, 242-43, 267-68.)

After each period 0f

retained jurisdiction, the district court again suspended Ross’s sentence and placed

him back on

supervised probation. (R., pp.149-50, 217-18, 248-49, 276-78.)
In

its

committing

ﬁfth report of probation Violation, the state alleged Ross violated his probation by

new crimes—injury to

child and petit theft.

(R., pp.286-87.)

The

district court

held

an evidentiary hearing on the allegations,

(E generally

ﬂ alﬂ

Tr.;

p.6, L.6

—

girls

that

p.7, L.3; p.7,

let

them

14,

(T12, p.8,

in.

She testiﬁed

When

came

girls

were

t0 the

Vicinity.

(TL, p.7, Ls.20-23.)

ofﬁce door, tapping on the

Ls.5-6.)

glass.

street.

The children

(TL, p.8, Ls.15-21.)

Ls.21-22.) She did not see any adult with them. (T12, p.9, Ls.2-5.)

that the children

was a cold day With a temperature
9,

(TL,

and

were barely clothed: the older

girl

girl

had “a pink T-shirt 0n

“only had on a saturated

was hanging down past her knees. There were n0 shoes on.” (TL,

(TL, p.8, L.14;

their behalf.

she ﬁrst saw them, they were in the middle 0f the

and no bottoms, n0 diaper, n0 shoes, n0 pants” and the younger
diaper that

0n

2019, shortly before 11:00 a.m., she saw

L.24 — p.8, L.2.) She estimated the

across the street and

Traxler

on November

There were n0 adults in the

(TL, p.7, Ls.12-15.)

it

parties called Witnesses

run across 3rd Street headed towards attorney Suzanne Graham’s ofﬁce.

(Tr., p.7, Ls.8-9.)

made

Which both

R., pp.297-306.)

Brandy Traxler testiﬁed
two young

at

in the 303; the children

L.22 — p.10, L6.)

were cold

p.8, Ls.7-12.)

t0 the touch

and looked

Traxler got a blanket from her truck for them.

Traxler asked them Where their mother

was and they

told Traxler she

It

pale.

(TL, p.9,

was sleeping and

pointed across the street from the direction they had come. (TL, p.9, Ls.8-15.) The police were
contacted and Ms.

Graham bought

clothes and fresh pull-ups for the children.

p.10, Ls.9-12.) Within about half an hour,

or adult supervision

came looking

law enforcement

(Tr., p.9, Ls.6-8;

arrived; during that time,

for the children. (TL, p.10, L.18

— p.1 1,

n0 parents

L.6.)

Next, Shadra Aragon, a child protection worker, testiﬁed. Aragon was familiar with Ross

from her work on
Tottenham
L. 1

.)

to

this case

and a previous

be the parents of the

Aragon testiﬁed

that she

case.

(T12, p.15, Ls.1-9.)

and

She knew Ross and Taylor
.

(TL, p.18, L.16

— p.19,

spoke with Ross and Tottenham 0n November 13—the day before

November

Traxler saw the children in the street—regarding a referral she received on

(TL, p.15, Ls.21-22; p.17, Ls.14-15.) They told her the children had gotten

failure to supervise.

outside through the back sliding glass door

by accident and

Aragon made contact with law enforcement and
went

(TL, p.18, Ls.9-13.)

contact With Ross or Tottenham.

for

“maybe

Emily Vanvalkenberg, a

(TL, p.21, Ls.2-6.)

residence, eventually answered the door.

Ls.13-17.)

make

Aragon estimated they knocked on the door

minutes” with n0 answer.

t0 the

this incident.

(TL, p.21, Ls.8-1

1.)

ﬁfteen, twenty

woman

Several minutes

staying at the

later,

door crying, asking Where her children were and What was going on.

Ross came

to the

door as well.

appeared t0 have just woken up.

passed since the children made their

Ofﬁcer Henry
p.26, Ls.21-24.)

He

Dunham

(TL, p.21, L.25

(T12, p.22, L.4.)

way t0

By

—

p.22, L.2.)

this time,

about an hour and a half had

a main corridor in the

is

1.)

Ofﬁcer

Dunham

two

children.

area—a heavily

being gone for so long

small children, and nobody even

Ls.7-10.)

spoke With Ross and “wanted t0

how nobody was aware
knew

that they

know

traveled,

(TL, p.28,

With the children

0f that With three adults in the house and two

were gone

for about

two hours-ish.”

Ross said he had been unaware the children were gone because he was

p.31, Ls.18-19; p.33, Ls.18—21.)

(TL,

estimated he knocked on the

door of Ross’s residence for about four minutes before Vanvalkenberg answered.

Dunham

(TL, p.21,

Ross and Tottenham

testiﬁed that he responded t0 check on the

testiﬁed that 3rd Street

Ofﬁcer

Tottenham

the ofﬁce. (TL, p.21, Ls.20-24.)

tWO-lane, one-direction road. (TL, p.28, Ls.1-1

L.14 — p.29, L.2.)

(Tr., p.17,

the children at the ofﬁce; then, she and

t0 Ross’s residence across the street t0

(TL, p.20, Ls.1 1-20.)

came

wouldn’t happen again.

it

L.17 — p.18, L.2.) The next day, Aragon was contacted about

the ofﬁcers

8 for

(Tr., p.30,

asleep.

(T12,

Turning to the

petit theft allegation,

(hereinafter referred to as “the

Vanvalkenberg,

Who was

Brian Lux, the owner of Best Avenue Vapor

vape shop”), testiﬁed. (TL, p.35, L.21.) Lux met Ross through

a customer 0f the store and job shadowing, although

LuX

testiﬁed that

Vanvalkenberg’s employment “wasn’t gonna work.” (TL, p.36, L.9 — p.37, L20.)

LuX became aware of a
(T12, p.38,

On

Ls.22-25.)

not scheduled t0

work

possible theft after Viewing the vape shop’s surveillance Video.1

the Video,

that day.

Lux saw Ross

(TL, p.37, Ls.1-8; p.39, Ls.15-17.)

display case, grab a device, and put

it

grabbed a jar of Kratom and an Orion
24.)

Ross put these items

enter the store with Vanvalkenberg,

(TL, p.39, L.18

in his pocket.

Q DNA

in his pocket

He saw Ross

salt nic

vape pen.

—

who was

reach behind a

p.40, L.2.)

Ross also

(T12, p.40, Ls.4-7; p.41, Ls.9-

and did not pay for them.

(TL, p.42, Ls.2-8.)

Lux

testiﬁed that the items were the property 0f the vape shop and he did not give Ross permission to

take them, nor had he given permission to any 0f his employees t0 allow Ross t0 take the items

Without paying for them. (TL, p.42, Ls.9-18.)

Ofﬁcer Jacob Brazle responded
surveillance Video.

(T12, p.56, Ls.3-13.)

shop and conceal them in his clothing.

t0 the store for the possible theft

Ofﬁcer Brazle observed Ross take items from the vape
(TL, p.56, Ls.14-21; p.58, Ls.7-17.)

items for Ofﬁcer Brazle as Kratom and an Orion

Q

Ofﬁcer Brazle spoke With Ross about the

salt nic.

incident.

he was in the shop and did not make any purchases.
told

Ross about the surveillance Video, Ross began

told Brazle the items

1

were

at his residence.

The Video was not introduced

at the

and reviewed the

(TL, p.59, Ls.13-15.) Ross admitted

and admitted

When Ofﬁcer

Brazle

t0 taking the items;

(TL, p.60, Ls.14-20.) Ross also told Brazle he

evidentiary hearing.

the

(TL, p.59, Ls.1-6.)

(TL, p.60, Ls.2-7.)

to cry

LuX identiﬁed

he

was

given a vape pen by an employee. (TL, p.63, Ls.20-24.) Ross indicated Vanvalkenberg

knew he

knew he took

the vape

took the Kratom and Roxanne Bujko, the employee working
pen.

When

(T12, p.64, Ls.9-15.)

knowing Ross took

L.13

— p.67,

Ofﬁcer Brazle spoke With Bujko over the phone, she denied

(TL, p.65, Ls.3-4.) Ross indicated there were two incidents involving

items.

vape pens—he was given one
(T12, p.66,

at the time,

at

an

earlier

time and admitted to taking one 0n

November

12.

L.8.)

Bujko testiﬁed she was working 0n November 12 When Ross and Vanvalkenberg came
into the

vape shop. (TL, p.75, Ls.2-14.) She testiﬁed

gave him a Zebra F vape
p.76, Ls.23-25.)

Bujko also testiﬁed

that

pens and she did not give Ross an Orion

an Orion

LuX gave her permission

Q vape pen or Kratom.
t0 the

L.21

— p.88,

p.90, L.18.)

testiﬁed.

He

L.6.)

He

authority t0 take

t0 take a container

evidence.

Traxler,

stated

0f Kratom.

it.

(TL, p.79, L.20
(Tr., p.80, Ls.

did.

1

—

p.80,

She
L3.)

8-23.)

(Tr., p.87,

helped Bujko stock shelves so she gave him a vape pen. (TL, p.89, L.23 —

(Tr., p.91,

trial

on the

district court

L.21

found the

Dunham

—

Kratom

p.92, L.6.)

petit theft charge.

(TL, p.110, Ls.8-10.)

and Ofﬁcer

(Tr., p.79, Ls.2-6.)

he went to the vape shop With Vanvalkenberg.

also testiﬁed that he took

entered after a jury

The

He

(T12,

(TL, p.77, Ls.12-25.)

vape shop.

Vanvalkenberg asked Ross to take the Kratom for her and he

Ross also

for the item.

and the Zebra F are different types of vape

Q

Vanvalkenberg testiﬁed she and Ross went
testiﬁed

Ross helped her stock shelves so she

Bujko testiﬁed she paid

(Tr., p.76, Ls.2-14.)

stick.

that

state

for Vanvalkenberg, believing she

Ross introduced

(Defense EX. A;

judgment of

Tr., p.96,

acquittal

L.10 — p.97, L.15.)

proved both allegations by a preponderance of the

Regarding injury t0

credible.

his

had the

child, the district court

(TL, p.1 12, Ls.15-19.)

relationship with the children as their parent, that he

It

found Aragon,

noted that Ross had a special

was asleep and “unable

to

be awakened even

after a

law enforcement ofﬁcer’s knocking on the door” for around ﬁve minutes, and

children were seen barely clothed.

couldn’t “imagine any

(Tr., p.1 10,

L.25 — p.1 12, L.1.)

The

that the

district court stated

more signiﬁcant danger than an unattended

it

and

running across 3rd Street in the middle of the day.” (TL, p.1 12, Ls.5-8.) After referencing
the statute, the district court found that the evidence “meets the elements of the statute, at least

certainly

on a more probable than not

Regarding the

Lux

credible;

it

basis.” (TL, p.1 12, Ls.1-10.)

petit theft, the district court

found Ofﬁcer Brazle credible.

found neither Ross, Vanvalkenberg, Bujko, nor

(TL, p.1 12, Ls.1 1-17.)

The

district court

found

Ross’s testimony that he told law enforcement he took the items because he took them but didn’t

steal

that

them

“to be an inherently incredible claim.” (TL, p.1 12, Ls.19-23.)

Ofﬁcer Brazle testiﬁed Ross

t0 taking them.

in the face

0f

(TL, p.1 12, L.24

common

started crying

when he brought up

— p.1 13,

The

L.1.)

district court

sense” that Ross would cry

permission to take them, 0r that he wouldn’t

tell

When

The

district court

Ross admitted

the items and

concluded that

it

“smacks

Ofﬁcer Brazle he had permission, particularly

in

was proven

p.1 13, Ls. 14-15.)

Thereafter, the district court revoked Ross’s probation and

sentence. (R., pp.309-10.)

right

saying he took items if he had

a jail setting. (T12, p.1 13, Ls.1-10.) Thus, the district court concluded the petit theft

by a preponderance 0f the evidence. (TL,

noted

Ross ﬁled a timely notice of appeal.

imposed

(R., pp.31 1-13.)

his underlying

ISSUE
Ross

Did

states the issue

on appeal

as:

the district court err in ﬁnding Mr.

Ross violated

his probation

by committing

the

crimes 0f petit theft and injury to child?
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Ross
the evidence that

failed to

show

Ross violated

When it found by
probation by committing new crimes?

that the district court erred

his

a preponderance of

ARGUMENT
Ross Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Found BV A Preponderance Of
The Evidence That He Violated His Probation BV Committing New Crimes
A.

Introduction

Ross argues

when

that the district court erred

committing new crimes 0f petit

theft

and injury

it

to child.

found that he violated his probation by
First,

Ross argues

erred in ﬁnding that he committed the crime 0f petit theft, given that he

crime by a jury. (Appellant’s
the evidence put

Violation

is

0n

at the

brief, pp.5-7.)

However, the

was

acquitted of that

ﬁnding

is

supported by

Because the burden 0f proof for a probation

evidentiary hearing.

lower than that for a conviction, there

ﬁnding and the jury’s

district court’s

that the district court

is

n0 conﬂict between the

district court’s

verdict.

Second, Ross argues that the

district court erred in

injury to child because there

was n0 evidence

(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-10.)

The testimony

worker Aragon, demonstrated

that

ﬁnding

that

he committed the crime of

Ross acted willfully and knew of the danger.

at trial, particularly the

testimony of child protection

Ross acted willfully when he permitted

that

his children to

be

left

unattended and able to get outside onto a busy street in the cold, given that Aragon spoke t0 him

one day prior

B.

t0 this incident about

Standard

“A

earlier

When his

children had gotten outside.

Of Review

district court’s

showing

that the court

656

App. 2013).

(Ct.

an instance days

decision t0 revoke probation Will not be overturned 0n appeal absent a

abused

A

its

discretion.”

State V. Day, 154 Idaho 649, 650, 301 P.3d 655,

“trial court’s factual

ﬁndings in a probation revocation proceeding,

including a ﬁnding that a Violation has been proven, Will be upheld if they are supported
substantial evidence.” State V. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 766, 171 P.3d 253,

257 (2007)

by

(citing State

122 Idaho 488, 490, 835 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1992); State

V. Russell,

V.

Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918,

923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003)). “In the event of conﬂicting evidence of the Violation
charged, this Court Will defer t0 the district court t0 determine the credibility 0f Witnesses.” State

V.

Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009).

C.

The

District

Court Did Not Err

Although a motion

to

When It Found Ross Violated His

revoke probation

is

not a criminal prosecution, a probationer has a

protected liberty interest in continuing his probation.

Therefore, a court

Li

probation.

at

Probation

M, 144

Idaho

at

766, 171 P.3d at 257.

may not revoke probation without ﬁnding the probationer violated the

765, 171 P.3d at 256.

At an evidentiary hearing,

“[t]he state bears the

terms of

burden of

providing satisfactory proof of a Violation though proof beyond a reasonable doubt
required.”2

Li. (citing State V. Kelsey,

115 Idaho 311, 314, 766 P.2d 781, 784 (1988)).

ﬁnding of a probation Violation must be based on veriﬁed
discretion

and the

facts,

err in

of Witnesses.”

ﬁnding

that

Settl—chez,

Ross violated

not

The

court’s exercise of

Li. (citing

812 P.2d 741, 742 (1991)). “In the event of conﬂicting

evidence of the Violation charged, this Court will defer t0 the

credibility

trial

must be informed by an accurate knowledge of the probationer’s behavior.

State V. Tracy, 119 Idaho 1027, 1028,

is

149 Idaho

his probation

at 105,

233 P.3d

by committing

district court to

at 36.

The

determine the

district court

did not

the crimes 0f petit theft and injury

to child.

2

The district court applied a preponderance 0f the evidence
Ross does not challenge that standard on appeal.

standard.

(E

T11, p.1 10, Ls.8-10.)

The District Court Did Not Err When
Committing The Crime Of Petit Theft

1.

The

the evidentiary hearing,

Ross take items from

LuX identiﬁed
p.40, L.4

—

(Tr., p.56,

about the incident.

He

told

testiﬁed that he reviewed surveillance Video and

Q DNA

from them.

salt nic

district court

(E

Tr., p.35,

L.21

—

saw

p.42, L.18.)

vape pen and a container of Kratom. (TL,

found LuX “generally”

(TL, p.1 12, Ls.15-17.)

t0

be not credible,

it

Ofﬁcer Brazle also reviewed the Video.

observed Ross take items from the store and conceal them in his

Ls.14-21; p.58, Ls.7-17; p.59, Ls.7-12.)

(TL, p.59, Ls.13-15.)

the vape shop and did not

when he

LuX

L24.) Although the

(TL, p.56, Ls.3-13.)

that

supported by substantial evidence.

his store Without paying

found Ofﬁcer Brazle credible.

clothing.

is

the items as an Orion

p.41,

Found Ross Violated His Probation BV

ﬁnding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ross violated his

district court’s

probation by committing petit theft

At

It

make any

Ofﬁcer Brazle spoke With Ross

Ofﬁcer Brazle testiﬁed

Ross admitted he was

that

in

(TL, p.60, Ls.2-7.) Ofﬁcer Brazle also testiﬁed

purchases.

Ross about the surveillance Video, Ross began

and admitted

to cry

t0 taking the

items. (TL, p.60, Ls.14-20.)

The

district court

himself—were not

determined that Ross’s witnesses—Bujko, Vanvalkenberg, and Ross

credible.

(T12, p.1 12, Ls.1 1-17.)

Therefore, the district court rejected their

version 0f events: that Bujko gave Ross a vape pen (notably, a different brand than that which

was taken) and Vanvalkenberg had Lux’s permission
p.76,

L25;

p.79, L.20

—

p.80,

L23;

p.89, L.23

—

to take the

Kratom.

p.90, L.18; p.91, L.21

court also rejected Ross’s explanation 0f his

comments

to

—

(E

Tr., p.75,

p.92, L.6.)

The

L.2

—

district

Ofﬁcer Brazle as “inherently

incredible”—that he admitted to taking the items because he did take them but didn’t steal them,

and he didn’t explain

that

he had permission because he “didn’t think

10

it

was

relevant.”

(ﬂ

Tr.,

p.93, Ls.9-15; p.100, Ls.12-18; p.1 12, Ls.20-23.)

are entitled to deference

E

this Court.

by

The

district court’s credibility

determinations

San_chez, 149 Idaho at 105, 233 P.3d at 36 (“In the

event 0f conﬂicting evidence of the Violation charged, this Court Will defer t0 the district court t0

determine the credibility 0f Witnesses.”).

The

credible testimony of

Ofﬁcer Brazle established

them

take items from the vape shop, conceal

Brazle’s testimony also

showed

that

in his clothing,

Based on

Ross violated

when found

his probation

Ross argues the
acquittal”

and

by committing

that there is

Although

this

clear the district court

First, the state

this credible evidence, the district

had proven by a preponderance of the evidence

by

“failing to consider the impact of the

“no authority that a

the

district court

can revoke probation based on an

precedent and rules

make

was not precluded by the

acquittal

this issue, its

from ﬁnding a probation

does not have t0 prevail in a criminal

trial t0

commission of a crime.”

t0

prevail

my,

conviction has been vacated or

(Ct.

is

154 Idaho

0n appeal, the

m ﬂ
Q;

is

Violation.

on an allegation

that a

n0 requirement

that a

ﬁnding a probation Violation when the alleged
at

651 n.1, 301 P.3d

State V. Wilson, 127 Idaho 506, 510-11, 903 P.2d 95, 99-100 (Ct.

1232

judgment of

brief,

Court has not directly addressed

commission 0f that crime.

that

committed a crime for Which he was acquitted.” (Appellant’s

judgment 0f conviction be a prerequisite
is

once

to taking the items

probationer violated probation by committing that same offense. “There

Violation

Ofﬁcer

petit theft.

district court erred

allegation that a probationer

pp.6-7.)

that the state

showed Ross

and not pay for them.

Ross began crying and admitted

Ofﬁcer Brazle brought up the surveillance Video.
court did not err

that surveillance Video

district court

also State V.

App. 1985).

11

at

657

n.1 (citing

App. 1995)). Even where a

may

revoke probation based on

Adams, 108 Idaho 215, 218, 697 P.2d 1229,

Second,

it

is

E M,

prosecution than at a probation hearing.

the state

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt

however,

burden in a criminal

clearly established that the state faces a higher

144 Idaho

at

765, 171 P.3d at 256. At

that the defendant

at

Evidence control what evidence

presented to a jury at

is

651 n.1, 301 P.3d

at

657

committed the alleged crime;

need not be proven beyond a

“[a] probation Violation, unlike a criminal conviction,

reasonable doubt.” DJa, 154 Idaho

n.1.

trial;

trial,

Further, the Idaho Rules of

however, “the Idaho Rules of

Evidence, including the rule against hearsay, d0 not apply to probation revocation proceedings.”

M, 144

Idaho

at

766, 171 P.3d at 257 (citing I.R.E. 101(c)(3)).

answer a different question

a criminal

at

trial

Therefore, a jury

than the district court

is

probation revocation hearing, and likely based on different evidence.

ﬁnd

court can (as the district court did here)

a

new

crime, even Where the probationer

was

asked to

asked to answer

Consequently, a

that a probationer violated probation

acquitted of that

is

at a

district

by committing

same crime.

“[A] majority of states Which have addressed the issue have found that an acquittal in a

same charge.”

criminal prosecution does not preclude revocation of parole or probation on the

State V. Martin, 56

Ohio

St.

2d 207, 210, 383 N.E.2d 585, 587 (1978);

Conn. App. 219, 225, 892 A.2d 302, 307 (2006)
is

(“It is

ﬂ

well settled that even

State V. Durant,

When

94

the defendant

acquitted of the underlying crime leading t0 the probation revocation proceeding, probation

may

still

be revoked”); People

V.

McEntVre, 127 Mich. App. 731, 732, 339 N.W.2d 538, 539

(1983) (“In a majority of jurisdictions, acquittal 0f criminal charges does not bar revocation 0f
probation based on the same facts.”); State ex

(Mo.

Ct.

App. 1984) (“the weight of authority

that probation

there has

rel.

may be revoked

been an acquittal of

as based

upon

Cooper

V.

Hutcherson, 684 S.W.2d 857, 858

in other jurisdictions support[s] the proposition

the facts 0f a charged criminal offense even though

that offense”);

ﬂ alﬂ Wade
12

R. Habeeb, Acquittal in Criminal

Proceedings as Precluding Revocation 0f Probation on
(originally published in 1977).

The vast majority of

Same Charge, 76 A.L.R.3d 564

states recognize that

an acquittal does not

have a preclusive effect on a probation Violation based 0n the same underlying offense because of
the lower burden 0f proof required t0

ﬁnd

a probation Violation. See,

g; In re Coughlin,

3d 52, 56, 545 P.2d 249, 252 (1976) (“probation may be revoked despite the
evidence of the probationer’s guilt

may be

insufﬁcient to convict

him of

the

16 Cal.

fact that the

new

offense”);

Johnson

V.

United States, 763 A.2d 707, 709 (D.C. 2000) (“probation

may be revoked even

accused

is

acquitted of an underlying offense”); Cruz V. State, 990

A.2d 409, 416

if the

(Del. 2010)

(evidence “was sufﬁcient t0 establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Cruz had violated
the terms 0f his probation

by possessing cocaine and

MDMA”

despite Cruz’s acquittal);

Stallworth V. State, 21 So. 3d 84, 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (“[a] defendant

may be found

to

have violated probation even though the criminal case based 0n the same conduct resulted in
acquittal”);

People

V.

Colon, 225

111.2d

125,

155, 866 N.E.2d 207,

224 (2007)

(“collateral

estoppel does not preclude the State from proceeding with a probation revocation hearing after a

defendant has been acquitted 0f the substantive charge”); Knecht

(Ind. Ct.

App. 2017) (“a prior

V. State,

85 N.E.3d 829, 836

acquittal 0f a criminal offense does not preclude a later

probation Violation based 0n the same offense”); People

N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (2008) (“Defendant’s acquittal

V.

Ruff, 50

ﬁnding 0f a

A.D.3d 1167, 1168, 854

after a criminal trial did not foreclose the

posthearing ﬁnding that he violated conditions 0f his probation, given the differing charges and
standards of proof in each matter.”); State V. Sasek, 844 S.E.2d 328, 334 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020);

State V. Eckley,

34 Or. App. 563, 567, 579 P.2d 291, 293 (1978) (“acquittal of a new crime does

not bar probation revocation based 0n that crime”); Panesenko V. State, 706 P.2d 273, 276 (Wyo.

13

1985) (“A court can revoke probation 0n the basis of criminal conduct even in the face of an

0f criminal charges based on the same conduct”).

acquittal

Simply
Whether the

put, the

judgment of

proved

state

at

The jury found

The jury did not make

found only that the

state did

Ross was “Not Guilty,” not

that

the ﬁnding that

Ross did not commit

that before the district court at the evidentiary hearing.

ﬁnd

that

The

theft

t0

by a

he was

petit theft; the jury

theft.

potentially different evidence than

district court

and properly considered the evidence presented

Ross committed the crime of petit

t0

it

at the

was not bound by

the

evidentiary hearing to

by a preponderance 0f the evidence.

The District Court Did Not Err When It Found Ross Violated His Probation BV
Committing The Crime Of IniurV To Child

2.

The

district

was required

t0

when

court did not err

committing the crime 0f injury t0

child.

it

found that Ross violated his probation by

In order t0

ﬁnd Ross committed

harm

0r death, ...wi11fully cause[d] or permit[ted]” his

children “t0 be placed in such situation that [their] person or health

In this statute, “‘willfully’

would know

injury to child, the state

prove by a preponderance 0f the evidence that Ross, “under circumstances 0r

conditions likely t0 produce great bodily

1501(1).

that

not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross committed petit

The jury’s decision was based 0n a higher burden of proof and

jury’s verdict

and law,

the evidentiary hearing that Ross committed petit theft

preponderance 0f the evidence.
“Innocent.”

acquittal is irrelevant, both as a matter of fact

the act 0r failure t0 act

means
is

acting or failing t0 act

likely to result in injury or

is

endangered.” I.C. § 18-

Where a reasonable person

harm

or

is

likely to

endanger

the person, health, safety 0r well-being of the child.” I.C. § 18-1501(5).

The testimony

at the evidentiary

hearing demonstrated that Ross’s

were seen crossing the busy main corridor 0f 3rd

14

Street

at

around

11:00

am,

unaccompanied by an
Traxler,

who

ﬁrst

saw

adult.

(TL, p.6, L.6

—

p.7,

L3;

p.7,

L.24 — p.8, L.2; p.28, Ls.1-1

1.)

the children in the middle 0f the street, described their state 0f undress: the

older girl had “a pink T-shirt on and n0 bottoms, no diaper, no shoes, no pants” and the younger

girl

“only had on a saturated diaper that was hanging

p.8, Ls.7-11.)

Neither wore shoes.

children were cold t0 the touch.

ﬁnally

made

(TL, p.8, L.11.)

down

The temperature was

(TL, p.8, L.14; 9, L.22

contact with Ross after nearly

hours since the children were seen in the

past her knees.” (TL, p.7, Ls.12-15;

—

street,

idea where his children were. (T12, p.21, L.13

When

p.10, L.6.)

ﬁve minutes 0f knocking

in the 30$

at the

and both

law enforcement

door and almost two

Ross admitted he had just woken up and had no

— p.22, L4;

p.31, Ls.18—19; p.33, Ls.18-21.)

Aragon’s testimony established that Ross was aware 0f the potential harm of leaving his
children unattended.

and undressed

Aragon testiﬁed

in the street, she

that the

day before the children were seen unaccompanied

spoke With Ross regarding a referral she received 0n November 8

for failure t0 supervise after the children

were

outside.

(TL, p.15, Ls.21-22; p.17, Ls.14-15.)

Ross told her the children had gotten out the back door by accident and
(T12, p.17,

it

wouldn’t happen again.

L.17 — p.18, L.2.) Yet, the very next day, the children were unsupervised and able t0

get out of the house again Without

Ross noticing

main road during the middle of the

day, barely clothed despite the near—freezing temperature.

The
certainly

LC.

district court

their absence,

this

time they crossed a busy

found that the evidence satisﬁed “the elements of the

0n a more probable than not

statute, at least

basis.” (TL, p.1 12, Ls.8-10.) After reading the language of

“I can’t
§ 18-1501(1), the district court stated:

unattended

and

imagine any more signiﬁcant danger than an

running across 3rd Street in the middle of the day.”

(TL, p.1 12, Ls.1-8.) The district court did not err

15

When

it

found that Ross violated his probation

by committing

— p.1 12,

injury to child, as established

by a preponderance 0f the evidence. (TL,

p.1

1 1,

L.7

L.10.)

Ross argues

that

the

state

The

(Appellant’s brief, pp.7—10.)

failed

t0

present

evidence that Ross

acted willfully.

willful element “requires that the person providing care 0r

known risk of harm.”

custody of the child willfully endanger the child by subj ecting the child to a
State V. Morales, 146 Idaho 264, 267, 192 P.3d 1088, 1091 (Ct.

App. 2008)

“does not require that the defendant intended to harm the child, but

it

(citation omitted).

It

does require that the

defendant placed the child in a potentially harmful situation with knowledge of the danger.” Li.

Although he concedes
“his children

“is

that

Ross placed

his children in a potentially harmful situation because

were endangered by a lack 0f supervision,” Ross nonetheless argues

not enough to

show Mr. Ross had knowledge of the danger.”

Ross’s argument overlooks Aragon’s testimony.

that fact alone

(Appellant’s brief, p.10.)

Beyond

the obviously

known

dangers

associated With a busy street during the middle 0f the day and being unclothed in near—freezing

temperatures, Aragon’s testimony established Ross

get out 0f the house

by themselves

about exactly that just one day

if

earlier.

they were

was aware of the

left

unattended.

Ross recognized the

risk

risk that his children could

Aragon had spoken With Ross

and assured Aragon

that

not happen again. Yet, Ross willfully permitted his children to be placed in what he

dangerous situation when he again allowed the
ability to get out

day.

Ross has

girls t0

of the house and into the busy

failed t0

show

street,

be

left

unattended While he

would

knew was

slept,

a

With the

unaccompanied and undressed, 0n a cold

that the district court erred

when

it

found by a preponderance 0f the

evidence that Ross violated his probation by committing the crime of injury t0 child.

16

it

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm the

district court’s

order revoking

probation and imposing sentence.

DATED this 29th day of September, 2020.
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